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The "choking game" is defined as self-strangulation or strangulation by another person with the hands or a noose to achieve a brief euphoric state caused by cerebral hypoxia. Participants in this activity typically are youths (1) . Serious neurologic injury or death can result if strangulation is prolonged. In recent years, news media reports have described numerous deaths among youths attributed to the choking game. Because no traditional public health dataset collects mortality data on this practice, CDC used news media reports to estimate the incidence of deaths from the choking game. This report describes the results of that analysis, which identified 82 probable choking-game deaths among youths aged 6-19 years, during 1995-2007. Seventy-one (86.6%) of the decedents were male, and the mean age was 13.3 years. Parents, educators, and healthcare providers should become familiar with warning signs that youths are playing the choking game (2) .
Death certificates lack the detail necessary to distinguish choking-game deaths from other unintentional strangulation deaths. Therefore, CDC identified probable chokinggame deaths from 1) a LexisNexis* search in November 2007 of newspaper reports since the 1970s and 2) reports on two choking-game-awareness websites, † which were created in 2005 and 2006 . Deaths of children listed on the two websites but not matched by LexisNexis newspaper reports were included in the assessment only if subsequent Internet searches located news media reports (e.g., from television stations) of the incidents confirming that the deaths met the case definition. For consistency, case characteristics were obtained only from news media reports.
A case was defined as a death, described in a news report, resulting from self-strangulation or strangulation by another person as part of an activity with elements of the choking game (also known as the "blackout game," "passout game," "scarf game," "space monkey," and by other names). Deaths were excluded if reports included any mention of autoerotic asphyxiation, a practice of choking oneself during sexual stimulation that is usually engaged in by teen-aged or adult males (1) . Deaths also were excluded if reports noted that the medical examiner ruled the death was a suicide or of undetermined intent coupled with no mention of elements of the choking game, or if the age of the decedent was missing from news reports. Cases were restricted to youths aged <20 years who were residents of the United States. Following are two examples of cases of choking-game deaths. Case 1. In February 2006, an adolescent boy aged 13 years came home from school in a good mood and had dinner with his family. He then went to his bedroom to do his homework. Approximately 1 hour later, his mother went to check on him and discovered him slumped in a corner with a belt around his neck. His face was blue. The mother began cardiopulmonary resuscitation while one of the other children called an ambulance. The boy died at a local Editorial Note: This report describes the first attempt to assess the national incidence of deaths among youths resulting from the choking game. Although asphyxial games might have been played by youths for generations, the use of a ligature while playing alone appears to be a new practice that can be fatal (1) . A search of medical literature produced no mention of the choking game until 2000. Information on the prevalence of this behavior is limited to the results of the 2006 Williams County (Ohio) Youth Health Risk Behavioral Survey, which included a question on the choking game. In that survey, 11% of youths aged 12-18 years, and 19% of youths aged 17-18 years reported ever playing the choking game (3) .
In this analysis, most decedents were males aged 11-16 years. These demographics are consistent with greater risktaking behavior among boys than girls, beginning before adolescence (4) . The data also are consistent with previous case studies (2, (5) (6) (7) and with the sex and age distribution for decedents aged 6-19 years whose deaths are attributed to all types of unintentional choking/suffocation. However, the age distribution differs from the distribution for suicides by hanging/suffocation. The age distribution for choking-game deaths among youths aged 6-19 years followed a normal distribution with a peak at age 13 years; deaths from suicide by hanging/suffocation among those aged 6-19 years increased steadily through age 19 years.
Whether choking-game incidence has changed in recent years is uncertain (1) . The increases in news media reports of choking-game deaths from three or fewer reports during 1995-2004 to 22 in 2005 and 35 in 2006 might indicate an increase in choking-game activity; however, the increase in reports also might indicate greater interest by the news media after the choking game was featured on national television (1) . Conversely, the decrease to nine news media reports of choking-game deaths in 2007 might indicate a decrease in choking-game activity or waning news media attention.
The findings in this report are subject to at least two limitations. First, the use of news media reports for mortality surveillance incurs the risk of low sensitivity and specificity. LexisNexis does not include all newspapers and does not include most (e.g., local) television news reports. In this assessment, a LexisNexis search identified only 59.8% of decedents, compared with 87.8% of decedents identified on the two choking-game awareness websites. Even when all newspapers in an area are examined, their sensitivity for unintentional injury surveillance has ranged from 59% for drowning deaths (8) to 96% for deaths from fires (9) and has been reported as low as 13% for homicides (10) . Further, this approach cannot be used to assess or characterize nonfatal injuries resulting from the choking game (2, 6, 7) . Additionally, newspaper reports might attribute deaths to causes or intents that differ from those recorded on death certificates (8) . In the design used in this study, information from news media reports could not be subjected to independent verification. Second, news media reports usually did not provide information on characteristics such as race/ethnicity, education, income, or the role of influence by peers or the media/Internet; therefore, analysis of these characteristics was not possible.
In this study, few of the parents of children who died had been familiar with the choking game. Parents, educators, and health-care providers should learn about the choking game and be able to recognize any of the following warning signs in youths: mention of the choking game (or the game by its other names); bloodshot eyes; marks on the neck; frequent, severe headaches; disorientation after spending time alone; and ropes, scarves, and belts tied to bedroom furniture or doorknobs or found knotted on the floor (2) . Medical examiners and coroners should be aware of the choking game as a possible explanation for deaths from self-inflicted strangulation in this age group that otherwise might be miscategorized as suicides (1, 2) . In addition, better mortality surveillance is needed, and more research should be conducted (e.g., questions on youthbehavior surveys regarding awareness of and involvement in the choking game) to determine prevalence, risk factors, and protective factors that will lead to effective interventions aimed at reducing or eliminating choking-game participation and deaths.
Invasive Pneumococcal Disease in Children 5 Years After Conjugate Vaccine IntroductionEight States, 1998-2005
Streptococcus pneumoniae (pneumococcus) is a major cause of meningitis, pneumonia, and bacteremia, especially among young children and older adults (1) . Before the 7-valent pneumococcal conjugate vaccine (PCV7) was introduced in the United States in 2000, the seven pneumococcal serotypes covered by the vaccine (4, 6B, 9V, 14, 18C, 19F, and 23F) caused 80% of invasive pneumococcal disease (IPD) cases among young children (1), and the incidence of IPD was relatively stable (2) . In October 2000, the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices recommended PCV7 for all children aged <2 years and for older children at increased risk for IPD (1) . Introduction of PCV7 in the United States led to substantial reductions in the incidence of IPD among the target population of children aged <5 years. Use of the vaccine also reduced IPD among unvaccinated populations through reductions in nasopharyngeal colonization and transmission of vaccinetype pneumococci from vaccinated children (i.e., indirect, or herd, effects of PCV7) (2) . To evaluate the effect of continued PCV7 use on IPD incidence among children aged <5 years in the United States, CDC analyzed populationand laboratory-based surveillance data. Results of that analysis indicated that in 2005, overall IPD rates among children aged <5 years were 77% lower, and an estimated 13,000 fewer cases of IPD occurred, compared with the years preceding vaccine introduction (1998) (1999) . Although IPD caused by PCV7 serotypes declined through 2005, overall IPD rates leveled off beginning in 2002, primarily because of increases in the incidence of IPD caused by non-PCV7 serotype 19A. Given these trends, use of expanded-valency conjugate vaccines might further reduce IPD incidence. Continued surveillance is needed to guide development of future formulations of conjugate vaccines and to monitor the effects of continued vaccine use.
Cases of IPD were defined as isolation of pneumococcus from normally sterile sites (e.g., blood, cerebrospinal fluid, or pleural fluid). Cases were identified through CDC's Active Bacterial Core surveillance (ABCs),* a populationand laboratory-based system ongoing since 1995. During 1998-2005, ABCs continuously monitored IPD in California (one county); the state of Connecticut; Georgia (20 counties); Maryland (six counties); Minnesota (seven counties); New York (seven counties); Oregon (three counties); and Tennessee (four counties). The total population aged <5 years under surveillance in 2005 was 1.26 million persons. Surveillance personnel at each site maintain routine contact with all clinical laboratories in the surveillance area and conduct laboratory audits every 6 months to ensure completeness of reporting. Pneumococcal isolates were serotyped at reference laboratories (CDC and Minnesota Department of Health) by use of the Quellung reaction and grouped as PCV7 types (the seven serotypes in the PCV7 formulation) and non-PCV7 types (all other serotypes).
Annual IPD incidence rates per 100,000 population were calculated using population estimates from the U.S. Census Bureau for prevaccine years (1998) (1999) , and racebridged, postcensal population estimates from the National Center for Health Statistics for postvaccine years (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) . Changes in incidence rates between 1998-1999 and 2005 were assessed by calculating relative risks (RRs) reported as percentage changes in rates of disease (percentage change in IPD = [1 -RR] × 100). To assess statistical significance of a percentage change in the incidence of IPD, 95% confidence intervals were calculated. To estimate the annual number of IPD cases in the United States, raceand age-specific ABCs incidence rates were applied to the race and age distribution of the U.S. population. To estimate the number of IPD cases prevented in 2005, the estimated number of cases in 2005 was subtracted from the average estimated number of cases in 1998-1999. National estimates of IPD cases prevented through vaccination (direct effects of PCV7) in 2005 were calculated as the product of 1) the estimated mean number of PCV7-type cases among children aged <5 years during 1998-1999; 2) national estimates of PCV7 coverage (a range of >1 dose to >3 doses) for each birth cohort during 2001-2005 derived from the National Immunization Survey (3); and 3) 94% vaccine efficacy against PCV7-type IPD (1). Among children born in 2001, 68% and 89% received >1 dose and >3 doses, respectively. Among children born in 2005, 84% and 95% received >1 dose and >3 doses, respectively. To estimate the number of PCV7-type cases prevented through indirect effects of PCV7 among children aged <5 years, the estimated number of cases prevented directly was subtracted from the difference between estimated PCV7-type cases among children aged <5 years during 1998-1999 and 2005.
The overall incidence of IPD among children aged <5 years declined from 98.7 cases per 100,000 during 1998-1999 to 23.4 cases per 100,000 in 2005 (Table) . Overall IPD rates were significantly lower in 2005 compared with 1998-1999 for each age group of children aged <5 years ( Figure 1 ). The largest percentage decline (82%) and the largest absolute rate reduction in overall IPD (175.8 cases per 100,000) were observed among children aged 1 year, the age group with the highest baseline rate (Table) . The incidence of PCV7-type IPD decreased significantly among all children aged <5 years from 1998-1999 to 2005. The largest absolute rate reduction in PCV7-type disease was observed among children aged 1 year (175.7 cases per 100,000). Non-PCV7-type IPD increased significantly among children aged <1 year and 4 years (Table) . The largest absolute rate increase in non-PCV7-type disease was observed among children aged <1 year (10.8 cases per 100,000). Among children aged <5 years, the incidence of serotype 19A IPD increased from 2.6 cases in 1998-1999 to 9 Figure 2 ). Of these, 11,000 (using >3-dose PCV7 coverage estimates) to 13,000 (using >1-dose estimates) PCV7-type cases were prevented directly by vaccination. The remaining PCV7-type cases (1, 200) were prevented through the indirect effects of PCV7. After accounting for an estimated 1,200 additional non-PCV7-type cases that occurred in 2005 compared with 1998-1999 (Figure 2) (2, 6) . The results of this analysis indicate that, in the general U.S. population, these increases have been small relative to declines in PCV7-type disease.
The findings in this report are subject to at least one limitation. The relationships between PCV7 coverage or numbers of PCV7 doses received and PCV7 effects could not be explored directly. Vaccination status was not available for persons with IPD, and PCV7 coverage estimates from a different data source were used to estimate PCV7 direct effects. Therefore, the level of PCV7 coverage needed to induce indirect (i.e., herd) effects is unknown. In this analysis, a range of PCV7 coverage estimates (>3 or >1 doses) for each birth cohort was used to obtain a range of estimates for the direct and indirect effects of PCV7.
Initial substantial declines in IPD after PCV7 introduction are strikingly similar to reductions in invasive disease caused by Haemophilus influenzae type b (Hib) after Hib conjugate vaccine introduction in the United States (7) . Increases in disease caused by H. influenzae serotypes other than type b were a concern; however, the experience with Hib conjugate vaccine indicates that non-type b H. influenzae were not as successful as Hib in causing invasive disease (8) . In contrast with the six serotypes of H. influenzae, approximately 90 pneumococcal serotypes have been described. Fortunately, different pneumococcal serotypes also vary in their ability to cause invasive disease (9) . The findings in this report suggest that expandedvalency conjugate vaccines for children that also provide protection against serotype 19A would be useful to improve prevention of IPD. A 13-valent conjugate vaccine containing type 19A polysaccharide and a 10-valent conjugate vaccine, which might provide cross protection against type 19A (10) , are currently in clinical trials. Continued surveillance for IPD is crucial to provide information on emerging pneumococcal serotypes and the optimal composition of future conjugate vaccines. 
Progress in Hib Vaccine Introduction
Countries apply to GAVI to request support for introduction of a vaccine. The application includes a financial plan, a vaccine introduction plan, and a 5-year national vaccine strategy. Applications are reviewed approximately four times per year by an independent committee, whose recommendations are later endorsed by the GAVI board. (Table) .
The pace of vaccine introduction has varied by region. As of December 31, 2007, approximately 80% of GAVIeligible countries in the WHO regions of Africa (30 of 36 countries) and the Americas (five of six) had introduced or been approved to introduce Hib vaccine. In addition, four of six countries in the Eastern Mediterranean region, four of seven countries in the Western Pacific region, and one of nine countries in the South-East Asia region had introduced or had been approved to introduce Hib vaccine. Among the eight countries of the European region, one country had introduced and two had applied to introduce Hib vaccine.
Recent Worldwide Increase in Hib Vaccine Access
The estimated total number of children worldwide who received the third dose of Hib vaccine increased from 8% (Figure) .** Among the GAVI-eligible countries that had not yet applied for Hib vaccine, three (India, Nigeria, and Indonesia) constituted 34%, 8%, and 6%, respectively, of the birth cohort in GAVI-eligible countries. Indonesia has indicated intent to introduce Hib vaccine in 2009; Nigeria and India have not made a decision (Table) . Because GAVI must negotiate prices with vaccine manufacturers and determine the cost at which to provide vaccines to countries, vaccine price is a major barrier to vaccine introduction. The price likely will decrease with upcoming Hib vaccine products, creating a competitive vaccine market. In certain countries, certain vaccines are available on the private market, and persons can pay for the vaccine themselves or using private insurance. However, government-funded vaccine programs help ensure availability for those who cannot pay.
The WHO-UNICEF Global Immunization Vision and Strategy focuses on helping countries develop the capacity to make informed, sustainable decisions regarding vaccine introduction (2) . Using this approach, the Hib Initiative conducts country visits and regional forums to assess barriers to decision making regarding Hib vaccine and to increase awareness of existing data on Hib disease and the potential impact of Hib vaccination. In addition, because limited Hib disease data have been a barrier to vaccine introduction in certain countries, the Hib Initiative developed a targeted research and surveillance agenda focused on collecting data needed to inform vaccine policy (e.g., data regarding Hib disease burden, the effect of Hib vaccine on disease in specific regions and populations [e.g., among HIV-positive children], booster doses, and cost-effectiveness).
In 2008, more countries are expected to begin using Hib vaccine. Countries have historically introduced vaccines 6-18 months after GAVI approval; of the 23 countries that are approved by GAVI to introduce Hib vaccine (20 in 2007 and three in [2005] [2006] , all are expected to introduce the vaccine during 2008. Vaccine introduction in these countries would increase the number of children with access to the vaccine to 35 million (44% of the GAVIeligible countries' birth cohort). In addition, six countries that applied in 2007 must resubmit their application in 2008, and at least eight additional applications are expected.
Several steps are required for additional progress in Hib vaccine introduction and to sustain the gains achieved. First, coordination, education, and financial support to make evidence-informed decisions are required to help countries that have not yet decided to introduce Hib vaccine, particularly for GAVI-eligible countries with large birth cohorts such as India and Nigeria. GAVI's Hib Initiative is investing in a comprehensive strategy in India to raise awareness of Hib vaccine and assist with data interpretation. Second, strong disease surveillance systems are needed to continue to document vaccine effects on disease epidemiology. Several countries with active surveillance have demonstrated high vaccine effectiveness and reduced disease burden after vaccine introduction (3) (4) (5) . Third, to achieve additional reductions in morbidity and mortality from Hib disease, routine infant vaccination coverage must be high, particularly among vulnerable populations. One study estimated that the use of Hib vaccine reduced mortality for children aged <5 years by 4% in the 42 countries where 90% of pediatric deaths occurred worldwide in 2000 (6) . However, increasing routine infant vaccination coverage requires strengthening of health systems and substantial commitment from countries and donors. Fourth, the current disparity in the use of Hib vaccine between lower income and higher income countries in the world should 
Notice to Readers

Publication of Health, United States, 2007
CDC's National Center for Health Statistics has published Health, United States, 2007, the 31st edition of the annual report on the nation's health. The report includes 151 detailed trend tables organized around four broad subject areas: health status and determinants, health-care use, health-care resources, and health-care expenditures. Many of the trend tables provide information on racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic disparities in health.
The report also includes the 2007 Chartbook on Trends in the Health of Americans, which assesses the current state of the nation's health and how it is changing over time, both positively and negatively, by presenting trends and information on selected determinants and measures of health status. Determinants of public health examined in the chartbook include demographic factors, healthinsurance coverage, health behaviors, and preventive health care. Measures of health status and risk factors focus on trends in mortality and limitations of activity caused by chronic health conditions. The 2007 Chartbook includes a special feature on access to needed or recommended healthcare services. It also presents information on financial barriers to receipt of health-care services, including lack of health insurance and high out-of-pocket expenses, and nonfinancial barriers to care, including lack of transportation and limited supply of health services or providers.
Health, United States, 2007 is available online at http:// www.cdc.gov/nchs/hus.htm. Information about the report is available from the National Center for Health Statistics Data Dissemination Branch by telephone (1-866-441-6247) or e-mail (nchsquery@cdc.gov).
Notice to Readers
Revised Recommendations for Responding to Fecal Accidents in Disinfected Swimming Venues
The 2001 CDC recommendations (1) for responding to fecal accidents in disinfected swimming venues (e.g., swimming pools) have been revised. Recommendations for responding to diarrheal fecal accidents, which are thought to represent a higher infectious-disease transmission risk than formed-stool accidents, are based on the potential presence of the chlorine-resistant parasitic protozoa of the genus Cryptosporidium. New data indicate that the recommended CT inactivation value (or contact time)* is higher than previously published (2), when inactivation is measured at a higher pH using an outbreak-associated Cryptosporidium isolate (3). Based on these data, the CT inactivation value used in CDC fecal accident recommendations for 99.9% inactivation of Cryptosporidium has been changed from 9,600 mg-min/L to 15,300 mg-min/L. † This change translates into longer swimming pool closures to ensure inactivation of Cryptosporidium.
Swimming pool operators should check existing guidelines from local or state regulatory agencies before using these recommendations, because CDC recommendations do not replace existing state or local regulations or guidelines. The CDC revised fecal accident response * The CT number refers to the concentration (C) of free chlorine in milligrams per liter (parts per million) multiplied by time (T) in minutes at a specific pH and temperature. † At pH 7.2-7.5, 77°F (25°C).
MMWR February 15, 2008
recommendations are available at http://www.cdc.gov/ h e a l t h y s w i m m i n g / p d f / f e c a l _ a c c i d e n t _ r e s p o n s e _ recommendations_for_pool_staff.pdf.
Notice to Readers
Medical Equipment Malfunctions Associated with Inappropriate Use of Cleaning and Disinfecting LiquidsUnited States, 2007
On October 31, 2007, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), in collaboration with CDC, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, issued a public health notification alerting health-care providers and the public about medical device malfunctions caused by improper use of cleaning and disinfecting liquids.* Inappropriate use of cleaning and disinfecting liquids on certain electronic medical equipment can cause equipment damage and malfunctions, which might have serious, even life-threatening consequences. Under the Safe Medical Device Act, health-care facilities are required to report to FDA any medical device malfunctions that cause or could cause death or serious injury. This notice provides recommendations to help prevent medical device malfunctions attributed to improper cleaning and disinfection.
Cleaning and disinfection are important practices to ensure that medical equipment surfaces do not serve as reservoirs for infectious pathogens. Cleaning is designed to remove infectious pathogens from inanimate objects, whereas disinfection is the process by which remaining pathogens are inactivated. Each of these two distinct processes usually involves the use of liquids (i.e., water and detergents for cleaning and chemical disinfectants for microbial inactivation). Because many types of equipment used in health-care settings have mated surfaces, moving parts, gaps, joints, and unsealed housings, improper cleaning and disinfection can create opportunities for fluids to enter the internal surface of medical equipment, resulting in damage that can cause or contribute to equipment malfunctions.
Health-care facilities, public health officials, and device manufacturers can take several measures to help improve device cleaning and disinfection and to prevent equipment malfunctions in the future. Facility staff should review equipment currently in use to determine which pieces of equipment have manufacturer instructions for cleaning but not for disinfection. Equipment that cannot be disinfected should be used in a way that minimizes the risk for contamination, for example, by positioning it far from contaminated areas or by covering it with a barrier that can be easily cleaned or replaced. If this is not possible, the facility should contact the manufacturer to discuss options for safe and effective disinfection. If the equipment is fluidtight, and both cleaning and disinfection instructions are provided by the equipment manufacturer, the recommended cleaning agents and chemical disinfectants should be used and the conditions for their use followed. Finally, personnel responsible for cleaning and disinfection must be given appropriate training.
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Mid. 12  10  21  39  48  14  19  39  81  109  4  8  24  47 40 8  12  32  66  71  -10  25  38  56  2  3  11  18  6  Alaska  -0  1  ---0  2  2  2  -0  0  --California  4  10  29  54  67  -7  18  27  41  2  2  10  17  6  Hawaii  -0 49  69  213  147  222  7  4  14  26  25  -3  11  4  20  Delaware  -12  34  32  47  -0 13  16  48  57  95  11  40  65  151  286  10  15  112  18  16  Delaware  -0  2  ---0  0  ---0  2  -2  District of Columbia  -0  1  -1  -0  0  ---0  1  --Florida  3  3  17  12  35  2  0  3  10  124  -0  3  --Georgia  -0  3  1  10  -5  31  42  18  -0  6  3  3  Maryland†   1  2  6  9  20  -8  18  8 3  20  40  31  137  -3  14  8  6  -0  4  --Arizona  -3  13  3  41  -2  12  7  5  -0  1  --Colorado  -6  14  5 47 37  112  309  332  424  1  9  38  5  7  12  27  70  99  148  Alaska  -1  5  2  2  N  0  0  N  N  -0  1  -3  California  32  85  196  276  374  1  5  33  4  4  10  21  61  87  130  Hawaii  1  1  13  21  --0  1  1  -1  0  3  5  -Oregon§   -6  16  24  32  -1  11  -3  -1  6  6  8  Washington  4  11  113  9  16  -1  18  --1  2  20  1  7 American Samoa - -1  3  3  1  16  19  31  97  71  Alabama§   N  0  0  N  N  -0  0  ---7  17  32  22  Kentucky  1  0  2  7  6  -0  1  1  --1  7  7  9  Mississippi  -0  0  ---0  0  --5  2  14  12  13  Tennessee§   3  3  10  39  20  -0  3  2  1  11  7  15 46 27 -2  12  4  29  -0  3  1  3  15  37  55  151  159  Arkansas§   -0  1  1  --0  0  ---2  1 0  7  1 2  Louisiana  -1  4  3  15  -0  2  1  1  5  10  23  15  19  Oklahoma  -0  10  -14  -0  2  -2  -1  3  6  12  Texas§   -0  0  ---0  0  --10  24  39  123  116   Mountain  -1  5  4  9  -0  2  -4  -7  25  10  56  Arizona  -0  0  ---0  0  ---3  17  2  27  Colorado  -0  0  ---0  0  ---1 -0  0  ---0  1  1  -4  40  60  120  268  Alaska  -0  0  ---0  0  ---0  1  -2  California  N  0  0  N  N  -0  0  --3  37  57  88  250  Hawaii  -0  0  ---0  1  1  --0  2 227  165  521  695  771  -0  34  ---0  18  --Arkansas¶   22  11  46  41  31  -0  5  ---0  2  --Louisiana  -1  8  5  30  -0  5  ---0  3  --Oklahoma  -0  0  ---0  11  ---0  7  --Texas¶   205  152  475  649  710  -0  18  ---0  10  --Mountain  1  41  130  72  369  -0  36  ---1  143  --Arizona  -0  0  ---0  8  ---0  10  --Colorado  -20  62  9  154  -0  17  ---0 ---------------Guam  -3  21  4  45  -0  0  ---0  0  --Puerto Rico  -11  37  11  61  -0  0  ---0  0  --U.S. Virgin Islands  -0  0  ---0  0  ---0  0  -- 
S. Atlantic
Delaware - 0 1 - - - 0 2 - 2 - 0 2 - 1 District of Columbia - 0 5 - 4 - 0 1 - - - 0 1 - - Florida -24 - 0 1 1 - 2 0 5 8 2 Colorado - 0 2 - 2 - 0 3 1 3 - 0 2 - 2 Idaho § - 0 2 2 - - 0 1 - 1 - 0 1 1 - Montana § - 0 2 - - - 0 1 - - 1 0 1 1 - Nevada § - 0 2 - 1 - 1 3 - 9 - 0 2 - 2 New Mexico § - 0 1 - 1 - 0 2 - 2 - 0 1 - 2 Utah - 0 2 1 1 - 0 2 2 - - 0 3 2 2 Wyoming § - 0 1 - 1 - 0 1 - - - 0 1 - 1
Pacific
1 - - - 0 2 1 - - 0 0 - - Oregon § 1 1 4 8 3 - 1 4 7 1 1 - 0 2 1 - Washington 3 1 6 4 1 - 1 7 1 2 - 0 2 - - American Samoa - 0 0 - - - 0 13 - - N 0 0 N N C.N.M.I. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Guam - 0 0 - - - 0 1 - 1 - 0 0 - - Puerto Rico - 0 5 - 10 - 1 5 2 8 - 0 1 - 2 U.S. Virgin Islands - 0 0 - - - 0 0 - - - 0 0 - -- 0 1 - 1 - 0 3 - 1 Kansas - 0 2 - 1 - 0 1 - - - 0 1 - 1 Minnesota - 1 483 - 7 - 0 8 - 4 7 0 4 7 - Missouri - 0 4 - - - 0 1 - 1 - 0 2 - 5 Nebraska § - 0 2 - - - 0 1 1 2 - 0 2 - - North Dakota - 0 2 - - - 0 1 - - - 0 1 - 1 South Dakota - 0 0 - - - 0 1 - - - 0 1 - 1
S. Atlantic
1 - 1 - 0 1 - - District of Columbia - 0 7 - - - 0 1 - - - 0 0 - - Florida - 17 - 0 2 - 3 West Virginia - 0 9 - - - 0 1 - - - 0 1 - - E.S. Central - 1 5 - 3 - 1 3 2 5 - 1 3 3 1 1 Alabama § - 0 3 - 1 - 0 1 1 - - 0 2 - 2 Kentucky - 0 2 - - - 0 1 1 1 - 0 2 - 1 Mississippi - 0 1 - - - 0 1 - 1 - 0 2 - 4 Tennessee § - 0 4 - 2 - 0 2 - 3 - 0 2 3 4 W.S. Central - 1 6 - 4 - 2 3 2 3 7 - 2 7 - 9 Arkansas § - 0 1 - - - 0 1 - - - 0 2 - - Louisiana - 0 1 - 1 - 0 2 - 2 - 0 3 - 5 Oklahoma - 0 0 - - - 0 2 1 1 - 0 3 - 2 Texas § - 1 6 - 3 - 1 3 2 2 4 - 1 4 - 2 Mountain - 1 3 1 2 - 1 6 1 5 - 1 4 1 9 Arizona - 0 1 - - - 0 3 - - - 0 2 - 2 Colorado - 0 1 1 - - 0 2 1 5 - 0 2 - - Idaho § - 0 2 - - - 0 2 - - - 0 2 1 1 Montana § - 0 2 - 1 - 0 1 - - - 0 1 - 1 Nevada § - 0 2 - 1 - 0 1 - - - 0 1 - 1 New Mexico § - 0 1 - - - 0 1 - - - 0 1 - 1 Utah - 0 2 - - - 0 3 - - - 0 2 - 3 Wyoming § - 0 1 - - - 0 0 - - - 0 1 - -N 0 0 N N - 0 0 - - - 0 1 - - Oregon § - 0 1 - - - 0 2 3 3 - 0 3 - 3 Washington - 0 7 - - 1 0 3 1 1 - 0 6 - - American Samoa N 0 0 N N - 0 0 - - - 0 0 - - C.N.M.I. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Guam - 0 0 - - - 0 2 - - - 0 0 - - Puerto Rico N 0 0 N N - 0 1 - 1 - 0 1 - 1 U.S. Virgin Islands - 0 0 - - - 0 0 - - - 0 0 - -
MMWR
- 0 0 - - - 0 2 - - North Dakota - 0 4 - - - 0 5 2 1 - 0 0 - - South Dakota - 0 7 1 8 - 0 2 - - - 0 1 - -
S. Atlantic
1 - 0 1 5 - - Louisiana - 0 2 - 2 - 0 0 - - - 0 1 - - Oklahoma 1 0 26 1 - - 0 22 - 5 - 0 20 - - Texas † 1 1 6 3 5 1 1 2 8 - 0 0 - - - 1 5 - 1
Mountain
- 0 0 - - - 0 2 - - Idaho † - 0 4 1 8 - 0 0 - - - 0 1 - - Montana † 3 0 7 7 5 - 0 3 - - - 0 1 - - Nevada † - 0 6 - 4 - 0 2 - - - 0 0 - - New Mexico † - 1 7 - 5 - 0 2 - - - 0 1 - - Utah - 6 27 15 18 - 0 2 - 1 - 0 0 - - Wyoming † - 0 2 - 9 - 0 4 1 - - 0 2 - -4 - 0 2 - - Hawaii - 0 1 - 2 N 0 0 N N N 0 0 N N Oregon † - 1 1 4 5 1 1 - 0 3 - - - 0 1 - - Washington 6 3 110 12 6 - 0 0 - - N 0 0 N N American Samoa - 0 0 - - N 0 0 N N N 0 0 N N C.N.M.I. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Guam - 0 0 - - - 0 0 - - N 0 0 N N Puerto Rico - 0 1 - - - 0 5 1 6 N 0 0 N N U.S. Virgin Islands - 0 0 - - - 0 0 - - - 0 0 - -United- 0 0 - - - 0 2 - 2 Nevada § - 5 1 2 - 1 8 - 0 3 - 2 - 0 1 0 - 8 New Mexico § - 5 1 3 - 2 1 - 0 3 - 7 - 2 6 - 1 3 U t a h - 4 1 7 7 1 6 - 1 9 - 2 - 0 5 - 1 Wyoming § - 1 5 8 1 0 - 0 0 - - - 0 5 1 1 2
Pacific
0 1 1 - - 0 0 - - - 0 1 1 - C.N.M.I. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Guam - 0 5 1 - N 0 0 N N - 0 3 1 1 Puerto Rico - 13 55 5 62 - 0 0 - - - 0 2 - 8 U.S. Virgin Islands - 0 0 - - - 0 0 - - - 0 0 - -§ N 0 0 N N N 0 0 N N Kentucky - 1 3 2 7 N 0 0 N N Mississippi N 0 0 N N - 0 2 - 21 0 2 3 2 - 0 1 1 - Montana § N 0 0 N N N 0 0 N N Nevada § - 0 1 - 1 - 0 1 1 - New Mexico § - 1 4 - 8 -
W.S. Central
